Why civilian control of the military

With war increasingly dangerous and destructive, where to divide the authority and assign the responsibility have become increasingly situational, and uncertain. The best way to understand civilian control, to measure its existence and evaluate its effectiveness, is to weigh the relative influence the military and civilians have in the decisions of state concerning war, internal security, external defense, and military affairs.

Sometimes, where civilian control is weak or nonexistent, military influence laps over into other areas of public policy and social life. Even in mature democracies that have long practiced civilian control, the balance between military and civilian varies with time and place, with the personalities involved, with the personal or political ambitions of senior military officers and leading politicians, and with the circumstances that give the military prestige and weight in public opinion.

Even in those democracies with rich traditions of unbroken civilian dominance, war and security can and have become so important in national life and so central to the definition of the state, that the military, particularly during or after a crisis or war, can use its expertise or public standing to limit civilian influence in military affairs. In the wake of World War II, senior American generals and admirals possessed great influence in government.

Nearly every American war has produced a heroic commander who emerges to run for president or consider doing so, Colin Powell being only the most recent example. Civilian control depends frequently on the individuals involved: how each side views its role and function; the public respect or popularity possessed by a particular politician, or political institution, or military officer, or armed force; the bureaucratic or political skill of the various officials.

The Truman-MacArthur crisis in originated in trying to limit a conflict early in the era of atomic weapons, in a part of the world the American political and military leadership deemed secondary in the Cold War struggle against communism. If civilian control of the military is, under normal circumstances, a process defined by the relative influence of civilian and military officials, then the central issue confronting scholars and policy-makers today is how to judge the extent to which civilian control exists, how well it functions, and whether it is sufficient for democratic governance.

Ultimately, civilian control rests upon a series of ideas, institutions, and behaviors that has developed over time in democratic societies.

Together they check the likelihood that the military will interfere in political life; together they constitute a system that provides civilian officials with both the authority and the machinery to exercise supremacy in military affairs.

Civilian control can support or sustain democracy, but civilian control is only one aspect of democratic rule; civilian control is necessary for democracy but not sufficient. Without a stable and legitimate governmental system and process, the military may be induced to intervene or interfere in order to protect society from chaos, internal challenge, or external attack—even though intervention may itself perpetuate instability and destroy the legitimacy of the government.

The tradition of legitimacy in government acts on the one hand to deter military interference in politics and on the other to counteract intervention should it threaten or occur. In countries with English legal traditions, but also in others like Switzerland or the Scandinavian states, the rule of law puts the military by definition under civilian authority and keeps it there.

The state must, as a matter of ongoing national policy, clearly and precisely specify the role of the military. Certainly uniformed leaders can and should be consulted in this process as the mission of the military changes to suit new conditions. But the military cannot define its own function or purpose.

Furthermore, every effort must be made to limit the military to external defense so that it functions as representatives of the whole society acting in the best interest of the entire nation.

SECOND, civilian control depends substantially on the mechanics of government — the methods by which civilian authority rules military forces. If they exist and function as an expression of the will of the whole society, their subordination must be broad, to the entire governmental structure, not simply to the president or prime minister who exercises command.

Dividing control does contain inherent dangers. The military can become adept at playing off civilian authorities against each other to exaggerate military influence. Accountability to parliament or to the legislature implies accountability to the populace. It forces public discussion of defense, justification of military budgets, the airing of policy, the investigation of mistakes and malfeasance.

Actively exercised, parliamentary power over the military contributes to transparency in military affairs that actually strengthens national defense by reinforcing military identification with the people and popular identification with the military. The judiciary plays a supporting, but nonetheless indispensable role, holding military individuals personally accountable in ways that prevent military interference in politics and assure that officers know that they will be punished for violations of law.

The military can be blocked from even considering interference or exercising power openly in two ways: through force, by other armed forces in society such as militia or police or an armed population ; and, by the knowledge that illegal acts will not be tolerated, and will lead to personal dishonor, disgrace, retirement, relief, fine, arrest, trial, conviction, prison—whatever punishment is legal, appropriate, and can be made to stick.

The more likely that violations of civilian control will not be forgiven and will be met by effective resistance, the less likely they are to occur.

Historically a most effective counterweight has been a reliance on citizen-soldiers as opposed to full-time professionals. But knowledge that revolt would lead to crisis and be opposed by an armed population, or that citizen forces might not heed the orders, has been an effective deterrent.

Size matters. Standing forces should be as small as security permits: so that the population consents to provide the resources, so that the military will be oriented exclusively to external defense, and to reduce civil- military friction.

Finally, the most important institution supporting civilian control must be the military itself. The fundamental assumption behind civilian supremacy is the abstinence by the military from intervention in government and political life.

While worldwide the coup has diminished in the last decade, in many places the threat still lingers. In still others, the military has the power to make and unmake governments, or to impose or block policies wholly outside the realm of national security, and certainly on issues of defense.

Civilian control is, by its very nature, nonexistent if the armed forces can use force, or military influence, to turn a government out of power, to dictate the character of a government or a particular policy, or to act in any way outside those areas of responsibility duly delegated by higher authority. Even the hint of such extortion, if allowed to persist or to go unpunished, intimidates civilian officials from exercising their authority, particularly in military affairs.

Therefore civilian control requires a military establishment trained, committed, and dedicated to political neutrality, that shuns under all circumstances any interference with the constitutional functioning or legitimate process of government, that identifies itself as the embodiment of the people and the nation, and that defines into its professionalism unhesitating loyalty to the system of government and obedience to whomever exercises legal authority.

The difficulty is to define their proper role and to confine their activity within proper boundaries even when those boundaries are fuzzy and indistinct. The scholar of civil-military relations in Israel, Yehuda Ben Meir, believes that the military should advise civilians, represent the needs of the military inside the government, but not advocate military interests or perspectives publicly in such a way as to undermine or circumscribe civilian authority.

Helpful to this ethos is an officer corps that is, in every respect possible, representative of the diversity or homogeneity of the larger society.

Those surveys should then form the basis of tailored assistance programming to help bolster and sustain the development of a robust civilian professional cadre capable of managing the armed forces of recipient states. In the United States, these efforts should build on the progress made toward incorporating defense institution building DIB elements in security-sector assistance programming. Security is a fundamentally political good provided by the state because it is based on a series of bargains about who will have power, how they may keep it, and how they may exercise it legitimately.

Security is therefore not simply a matter of technology and materiel, nor is it reducible to the mere existence of capable military units. Rather, security requires the existence of a capable military controlled by empowered state actors, themselves accountable to the law and the population. From a humanitarian perspective, civilian control increases the probability that militaries will operate with respect for the population because it increases accountability to that population.

Democratically accountable civilian control is also associated with more prudent internal uses of armed force. Militaries with excessive autonomy from the state—or with largely party- or identity-based lines of authority—often engage in corruption or coerce the population with impunity. But shortcuts to civilian control can also undermine security.

Coup-proofing efforts , for example, can empower civilians but make the military less professional and effective.

Civilians need to have the capacity to manage the military closely and in ways that do not implicate the military in domestic politics. Competent civilian controllers in an empowered Ministry of Defense MoD also serve coordination and centralization functions, saving NGOs from having to conduct separate negotiations with different military commands and allowing them to work more effectively with the government.

Thus, both the existence and the quality of civilian control of the military have direct impacts on the safety of the population and the success of humanitarian activities.

Yet donor states involved in both security-sector reform and humanitarian assistance rarely emphasize capacity building for civilian control to the extent necessary. The trouble with most existing training about civilian control of the military is twofold. First, it is explained as a principle, rather than as a practice. It is therefore unclear how to facilitate it or even to know what it looks like.

Often, the mere existence of civilians at the head of government can be misconstrued as fully satisfying civilian control, when in fact their presence is its most rudimentary condition. Exercising civilian control involves a broad range of activities, including developing policy aims, providing resources, conducting oversight, and ensuring accountability mechanisms. The second problem with most training about civilian control is that those who should practice civilian control of the military are not the ones, by and large, receiving the training.

Instead, civilian control is usually included as a brief addendum to the military professionalization curriculum, suggesting that civilian control is possible largely through military inaction rather than civilian action. DIB framework. But the fact remains that the nuts and bolts of exercising civilian control are not taught to civilians.

Taken together, these two problems mean that even when civilian control is part of a curriculum, it is presented to people in uniform as an abstract standard for them to uphold, not taught as a skill set to the civilians whose job it truly is to carry out. To be fair, the dearth of training in civilian control is not confined to security-assistance programming in emerging democracies.

Civilians in the United States do not get specific education and training in guidance, management, and oversight of the military either. Such lengthy experience is possible because the Constitution and the structure of the Department of Defense and the National Security Council are geared toward allowing only civilians to serve in key roles of authority over the military. These formal rules have been bolstered by a political culture that also values civilian leadership.

Countries without such a tradition of investing in and elevating a capable civilian security cadre that also have a history of unstable, coup-prone domestic politics must take a deliberate approach to developing capacity for civilian control of the military. Most states in the Sahel have a long post-independence history of military involvement in national politics that makes it difficult to establish the ideal equilibrium between civilians and the military sketched above.

Indeed, Senegal is the only country in the Sahel never to experience military rule of some type. It is important to note that it is unlikely that by delegating the authority to members of the military profession, Trump and Bush were trying to weaken civilian control. The second driver of civilian deference to the military is avoiding responsibility. In this case, delegating policymaking responsibilities to the military constitutes a benefit in itself because it allows the government to avoid the political costs associated with the policy.

While civilian authorities do have the right to be wrong, 64 the price for exercising this right can be losing public approval and reelection. Therefore, when forced to make difficult political decisions, the government may abdicate its policymaking responsibilities and delegate them to military officers. When avoiding responsibility drives erosion by deference, the government will demonstrate reluctance to proceed with the policy in question. Unlike with boosting approval, where elected officials present a joint front with members of the military profession to gain more support, the key objective of deference driven by avoiding responsibility is not to lose support.

Therefore, the executive has to distance himself or herself from the policy. This driver of deference is most likely to be set in motion when the policy bears potential costs to the elected executive. Such a policy might involve undermining campaign promises or reversing previously promoted policies, a high likelihood of casualties, a rapid increase in spending, or cooperating with a political opponent.

In practice, the executive is likely to withdraw from the policymaking process and even blame the military for adopting the policy. For example, on July 13, , Trump delegated the authority to determine troop levels in Afghanistan to then-Secretary of Defense Mattis.

Leaving this choice to the full discretion of the military-dominated Department of Defense decreased civilian input in this crucial policy matter. Therefore, this move matches the definition of erosion by deference. The evidence indicates that avoiding responsibility is a plausible explanation.

The president made several moves to distance himself from this potentially costly policy. First, he delegated the difficult decision to the Department of Defense.

Then he publicly stated his reluctance to follow through with the proposed plan. I also share their frustration over a foreign policy that has [spent] too much time trying to rebuild countries in our own image instead of pursuing our security interests. Such behavior suggests that avoiding responsibility was the primary driver for erosion by deference in this case. In addition, distancing himself from the military and the decisions it made excludes the boosting approval explanation, which presumes a visible joint civil-military policy effort.

Delegating policymaking prerogatives to members of the military profession in the face of costly policies or challenging crises is not unique to the Trump administration. This was what happened when President Bill Clinton appointed Gen. Clinton interviewed only one person — McCaffrey, who was a four-star general. Why did Clinton decide to appoint a four-star general to this position? The evidence suggests that avoiding responsibility is the most likely explanation. Initially, when Clinton ran for his first presidential term, he did not have a strong anti-drug policy agenda.

In the presidential debates in , he mentioned drugs four times — three times in relation to how his brother suffered from drug addiction, and once as part of a list of general problems pertaining to racial divisions in the United States.

Finally, when questioned in public about the effectiveness of the anti-drug policies, Clinton tried to minimize his responsibility. For example, during the presidential debates on Oct. In response, Clinton said that he thought that McCaffrey might have reached a conclusion that doing so would be a good thing.

As with trying to boost approval, when an effort to avoid responsibility drives the executive, the erosion of civilian control is a byproduct of civilian deference, not its goal. The third driver of civilian deference to the military that leads to erosion of civilian control is cajoling the military with power.

When this takes place, the government delegates some policymaking tasks to members of the military profession to abate civil-military tensions. It is not only civilian officials who defer to senior military officers both retired and active-duty.

Fellow officers and soldiers also view generals and admirals with high levels of respect and veneration. Resisting pressure from the military might be especially challenging for presidents without previous military experience. Indeed, the civil-military tensions of the Clinton era, or when Gen. In addition, the possibility that opposing civilian elites e. It is also different from avoiding responsibility, since in the case of cajoling with power, the government would strive to portray the relationships with the military as supportive and cooperative.

For example, over the eight years of the Obama administration, security policy underwent scrupulous civilian scrutiny, including multiple rounds of questions and edits. In contrast to his predecessor, Trump decided to relax civilian control of U. In the first months of his administration, he proclaimed parts of Yemen and Somalia to be zones of active hostilities and expanded the authorities of U. It therefore constituted erosion of civilian control by deference. Why did Trump decide to loosen civilian scrutiny over counter-terrorism raids?

To begin with, Obama-era interagency deliberations on defense and security were often criticized as micromanagement that stymied the policy process and slowed-down the operations. Given his low and decreasing popular approval, he would not have been able to sustain as high a level of civil-military conflict as the previous administration.

These conditions motivated cajoling the military with power. It is crucial to keep in mind that cajoling the military can sometimes come into conflict with popular approval. The three drivers of deference are rooted in the triangular power relationship between the public, the government, and the military.

Each stems from different intentions on the side of the government. Boosting approval is aimed at gaining more popular approval for government policies. Avoiding responsibility is supposed to prevent political losses by shielding the executive from criticism from political opponents, the media, or the public. Cajoling with power is meant to influence the military and reduce civil-military tensions. Driven by these three motivations, civilian deference to the military launches the process of erosion of civilian control that can have devastating consequences for civil-military relations and broader political institutions and processes.

Mattis specifically preferred those who had previously served with him at U. Central Command and Navy and Marine Corps officers. At the same time, unable to adapt to the military-dominated working style, a number of career civilian staffers left their jobs. Craig Faller, who led those meetings.

Not only did the number of uniformed personnel in the Pentagon increase, but so did the political power of some military members.

Kevin Sweeney, together with Faller, acquired enormous influence in day-to-day operations and communications in the department. This resulted in Faller, who was an active-duty admiral, issuing directives to senior civilian appointees who had been confirmed by the Senate.

This change did not go unnoticed. The civil-military balance of power only worsened throughout the Trump presidency. With many civilians leaving the Pentagon and about 40 percent of political appointments remaining unfilled by the administration, the relative power of the Office of the Secretary of Defense decreased while the influence of the Joint Staff within the Department of Defense increased substantially.

When I joined the military, some 50 years ago, I swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution. Never did I dream that troops taking that same oath would be ordered under any circumstance to violate the Constitutional rights of their fellow citizens — much less to provide a bizarre photo op for the elected commander-in-chief, with military leadership standing alongside.

This shows how much preference the members of the military profession receive in media coverage and public discussion in comparison to prominent civilian politicians. For instance, when Clinton decided to abolish the ban on openly homosexual individuals serving in the armed forces, he became the target of harsh criticism from the military, including both active-duty and retired officers.

As discussed earlier, using the military to increase public approval can undermine popular trust in the military as a non-partisan institution. In the United States, Republicans historically have had higher confidence in the military. To account for potential confounders, I controlled for gender, race, education, age, and income.